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Full Idea
Armstrong takes properties to be universals, and believes there are no 'uninstantiated' universals.
Clarification
Something is 'instantiated' if examples of it exist
Gist of Idea
Properties are universals, which are always instantiated
Source
report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978]) by John Heil - From an Ontological Point of View §9.3
Book Ref
Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.91
A Reaction
At first glance this, like many theories of universals, seems to invite Ockham's Razor. If they are always instantiated, perhaps we should perhaps just try to talk about the instantiations (i.e. tropes), and skip the universal?
| 15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
| 10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
| 4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
| 10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |